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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1983 decision, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply
Co.,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to halt "gray" mar-
ket sales, Le., sales of genuine trademarked products made without
permission of the U.S. trademark owner.2 The Second Circuit
required that U.S. trademark owners prove irreparable injury before
the court could properly issue an injunction. While the Bell & Howell
litigation continued in the lower courts under the new standards
* Winner-articles competition, International Law Section, District of Columbia Bar
Association.
t Associate Professor of Law, Baruch College, The City University of New York;
J.D. Albany Law School (1980); LL.M., N.Y.U. School of Law (1981).
1. 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (the Second Circuit demanded that the plaintiffs prove
irreparable injury as a prerequisite to relief from gray market imports and sales). For a
detailed discussion of Bell & Howell, as well as a general overview of the problem of gray
market sales, see Lipner, The Legality of Parallel Imports: Trademark, Antitrust or
Equity?, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 553 (1984).
2. See generally The $7 Billion Gray Market: Where it Stops Nobody Knows, Bus.
WK., April 15, 1985, at 86; Inside the Gray Market, TIME, October 28, 1985, at 76.
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espoused by the Second Circuit,3 the trademark owners and trade
associations shifted the focus of gray market litigation. In several suits
brought in a variety of jurisdictions, 4 these groups sought to force the
United States Customs Service to strictly enforce the dictates of sec-
tion 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930,5 which on its face presents an abso-
lute bar to all nonauthorized gray market imports.6 Customs,
however, has, by both regulation7 and ad hoe decision-making,8 long
refused literal enforcement of the statute. Instead, Customs selectively
enforces section 526 and refuses to bar imports when the same or affili-
ated companies own the U.S. and the foreign trademark, or when the
U.S. trademark owner has authorized the foreign manufacturer to use
the trademark.9 Because a Customs bar would provide a cheap and
effective solution to gray market competition, domestic trademark
owners sought a change in Customs' practice.
The circuit courts of appeals recently addressed the legality of the
Customs Service's practice in three major cases.' 0 The Federal" and
3. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
4. See, eg., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 791 (1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT)
v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625); see also In re Certain
Alkaline Batteries (Duracell), 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (1984), disapproved by President
Reagan, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (1985).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
6. Section 526 makes it illegal "to import into the United States any merchandise if
such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of [the United States], and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States
... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of
making entry." 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). Merchandise imported into the United States
in violation of § 526 is subject to seizure and forfeiture by the United States Customs Ser-
vice, the entity charged with enforcing the statute. Id. § 1526(b). In addition to injunctive
relief, U.S. trademark owners may bring a private action against the importer of merchan-
dise prohibited under § 526 for damages and lost profits. Id. § 1526(c).
7. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(3) (1985).
8. See Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the
United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1969); see also Vivitar, 593 F.
Supp. at 432.
9. The regulations read, in pertinent part:
The restrictions [on importation] do not apply ... when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark. .. are owned by the same person or
business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark.., owners are parent and subsidiary
companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark ... applied
under authorization of the U.S. owner.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1985).
10. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve
the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625); Vivitar Corp.
v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
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Second 12 Circuits upheld the regulations, while the D.C. Circuit 13
declared the regulations void, but nevertheless refused to enjoin Cus-
toms' continued enforcement.14 The combined result of these cases is
a checkerboard of reasoning and conclusions about legislative history,
agency discretion, and implied Congressional ratification. 15 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
1 6
but granted certiorari in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States.1 7  The Supreme Court's
recent grant of certiorari in COPIA T may resolve some of the conflicts
presented by the cases. This Article will examine the conflicting deci-
sions under section 526 and attempt to devise an analytical framework
and a rational solution to the gray market riddle.
II. THE RECIPE FOR GOULASH
A. VI rTAR
The first case to reach the court of appeals level was Vivitar Corp.
v. United States.18 Vivitar Corporation brought an action in the U.S.
Court of International Trade, 19 seeking a declaratory judgment that
Customs had violated section 526 by allowing importation of gray
market photographic equipment bearing the VIVITAR trademark.20
Judge Restani of the Court of International Trade held that the Cus-
toms regulations were valid despite Vivitar's argument for literal inter-
pretation of section 52621 because (1) the history of section 526
indicated a narrow Congressional intent to overturn a judicial decision
of the 1920s;22 (2) the Customs Service regulations represent a long-
11. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570-1. See infra text accompanying notes 18-36.
12. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320; see infra text accompanying notes 58-80.
13. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918; see infra text accompanying notes 27-57.
14. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918; see infra note 56.
15. See infra note 82.
16. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
17. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986)
(No. 86-625).
18. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
19. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
20. Id. at 422. Vivitar Corporation is a California corporation that licenses foreign
manufacturers to apply the VIVITAR trademark to photographic equipment. Vivitar's
wholly-owned subsidiary markets the goods outside the United States; unrelated third par-
ties have purchased these goods abroad and imported them into the United States without
Vivitar's consent. Customs refused to ban the imports under 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3)
(1985).
21. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 423.
22. Id. at 426-28. The controversial decision was A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275
F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). Katzel was a trademark infringement
action. The plaintiff in Katzel had purchased the U.S. trademark rights of a French manu-
facturer. The defendant purchased the French manufacturer's product abroad, and
imported the goods into the United States without the plaintiff's consent. The Second
Circuit in Katzel denied injunctive relief to the U.S. markholder holding that "[if the goods
19871
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standing section 526 enforcement policy, and should therefore be con-
trolling;23 and (3) Congress impliedly ratified Customs' practices by
not addressing the discrepancy when it amended section 526 in 1977.24
Judge Nies, writing for a unanimous five-judge panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, rejected each of Judge Restani's
rationales,25 but nevertheless upheld the regulations as a valid exercise
of agency discretion "in initiating administrative enforcement of the
statute."' 26 The Federal Circuit expressly rejects literal enforcement of
section 526,27 not because of any express or implied indication of Con-
sold are genuine goods covered by the trademark, the rights of the owner of the trademark
are not infringed." Id. at 543. Congress enacted § 526 as an amendment to the Tariff Act
of 1922 while appeal of the Katzel decision was pending before the Supreme Court. See
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For a general discussion of Katzel, see Lipner, supra
note 1, at 555-57. Judge Restani's opinion reviewed and excerpted portions of the confer-
ence report and floor debate, and concluded that "[tihe history makes very clear that the
purpose of [the statute] was to reverse the Second Circuit Katzel decision." Vivitar, 593 F.
Supp. at 427.
23. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-32. Judge Restani reviewed Customs' practices and
policies and concluded that the "essential thrust of this regulation has remained unchanged
since 1936." Id. at 429. In addition, Judge Restani stated that "[c]ustoms, in its own
writings, ... has provided persuasive exegesis of the legal justification for this construc-
tion." Id. at 432.
24. Id. at 432-33. In 1978, Congress amended § 526 to permit travelers to import
trademarked goods for their own use. The court found that Congress had examined Cus-
toms' practices on all gray market situations, and its decision to leave the administrative
policy undisturbed was a "sufficient indication of Congressional acquiescence in Customs'
administrative practice." Id. at 433.
25. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). The Federal Circuit rejected the congressional intent argu-
ment, stating that "while reversal of the Katzel decision was one purpose of [§ 526], it was
clearly, and we use that word advisedly, not the sole purpose." Id. at 1561 (emphasis in
original). The long-standing administrative interpretation argument was disputed. Citing a
recent solicitation by Customs for data on the gray market, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453-56 (1984),
and the Customs brief in a recent gray market case, the court held that "it appears that
Customs has had continuing questions concerning the reading of the statute." Vivitar, 761
F.2d at 1568. Regarding the implied ratification theory, Judge Nies, after a brief review of
the recent legislation, remarked tersely: "[1]egislation by total silence is too tenuous a the-
ory to merit extended discussion." Id.
Judge Davis concurred separately in the result, criticizing his colleagues for extensively
delving into questions of the interpretation of § 526 "as [it] applies between private par-
ties," an issue which could not come before the Court of International Trade ("CIT"). Id.
at 1572 (Davis, J., concurring). "To me, it is needless and gratuitous for this court, in this
international trade case coming from the CIT, to indulge in lengthy dicta bearing on the
full scope of § 1526(a), obiter dicta which will not bind any court in a private suit but which
simply tends to confuse the trademark bar." Id.
Judge Davis further disagreed with the majority that Customs' regulations did not repre-
sent a long-standing adminstrative interpretation of the statute. Judge Davis found the
regulations to be "substantially consistent" since 1936. Id.
26. Id. at 1569. The Vivitar court stated that Customs' regulations do not set the limit
of the § 526 exclusion right, but rather "courts must independently determine whether the
importation is or is not precluded by the statute." Id. Asserting that "variations of the
gray market are myriad," the court stated that "Congress could not have foreseen all pos-
sibilities in international trade relationships at the time of enacting the statute." Id. at 1570.
27. Id.
GRA Y MARKET GOULASH
gressional intent, but rather because logic seemed to dictate that the
statute might have some "implied limitations. ' 28 The court concluded
that an apparent right to invoke the statute could be defeated by theo-
ries such as piercing the corporate veil, sham transactions, estoppel,
fraud, and other defenses.29 Thus, according to the court, case by case
analysis, rather than literal enforcement, is required to decide whether
the statute should be applied to a given situation. 30
Because the Customs regulations do not "affect the actual scope
of a trademark owner's rights [against] an importer under the stat-
ute,"' 31 the court directed complaining trademark owners to pursue
private remedies authorized by the statute in the federal district
courts. 32 "To obtain.., protection [beyond that in the current Cus-
toms regulations]," wrote Judge Nies, "Vivitar must first pursue a
determination of its alleged rights against persons engaging in parallel
importation of VIVITAR photographic equipment in federal district
court, and, if successful, [Vivitar] is entitled to have the [goods]
excluded by Customs."'33 The Federal Circuit's decision in Vivitar has
been criticized for not sufficiently deciding the contours of section
526. 34 This Article will argue, however, that gray market cases must
be decided, as the Federal Circuit suggests, through "resolution of
[the] complex factual situations" 35 in which these disputes arise.36
Any attempt at formulating a broad, all-encompassing rule would be
both inappropriate and unwise.
B. COPIA T
One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in Vivitar, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a decision that Customs' regula-
tions regarding gray market imports were invalid.37 The plaintiff in
the case was an association of U.S. trademark owners, the Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, known by the acro-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1569; see supra note 26.
32. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. These remedies include injunction and damages. 19
U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982).
33. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. But, said Judge Nies, "[t]hat Customs regulations do not
provide for exclusion initially in a case where the trademark owner ultimately prevails in
federal district court does not mean that regulations must be declared invalid." Id.
34. See, e.g., Note, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclu-
sion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.ER. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 83, 110-11 (1985).
35. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
36. See infra notes 105-44 and accompanying text.
37. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986)
(No. 86-625).
1987]
108 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:103
nym COPIAT. COPIAT sought, as had the plaintiff in Vivitar, a
declaratory judgment that Customs' gray market regulations were
invalid.38 The district court upheld the regulations as a "sufficiently
reasonable" interpretation of section 526, "supported by the legislative
history, judicial decisions, legislative acquiescence, and the long-stand-
ing consistent policy of the Customs Service."' 39
After holding that the district court in fact possessed jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit,4° the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Silberman, held that "the regulations simply cannot be squared
with § 526 and are thus invalid. '41 Judge Silberman criticized the dis-
trict court's deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute,
writing that such deference "only comes into play when it is apparent
that 'Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue'." 42 The D.C. Circuit concluded that deference to Customs'
interpretation of the statute was inappropriate because "Congress'
intent in § 526 is clear."' 43 Reviewing the legislative history of section
526 at the time of enactment, the court noted "that [§ 526] absolutely
barred importation of goods bearing an American company's trade-
mark without that company's consent."44 The D.C. Circuit further
found that Congress "consciously drew the line at American compa-
nies," 45 and did not adopt the distinctions that Customs now urges,
viz. that enforcement depends upon common ownership or authoriza-
38. Id. at 904. COPIAT also sought an injunction prohibiting Customs' continued
enforcement of the regulations and "compelling enforcement of the express terms of the
statutes." Id.
39. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
40. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-07. Jurisdiction was challenged only by 47th St. Photo,
an intervenor in the suit. Id. at 905 n.l. The Vivitar court, however, reached a contrary
conclusion. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-60. Judge Restani had held, and the Federal Circuit
agreed, that the Court of International Trade possessed exclusive jurisdiction over this type
of matter because it was in the nature of a "protest" to exclusion of goods by Customs. Id.
at 1558-59. The D.C. Circuit in COPIAT rejected the Vivitar court's analysis and held that
because no goods were excluded a case challenging Customs' gray market regulations did
not involve a protest to exclusion and federal district jurisdiction was proper. COPIA T,
790 F.2d at 906. While technically correct, the D.C. Circuit's view is apparently in conflict
with the congressional policy, expressed in the Customs Court Act of 1980 (which created
the Court of International Trade), to consolidate jurisdiction over suits against the govern-
ment in international trade matters in the new specialized court. H.R. REP. No. 961235,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3745.
But see Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986) (trademark
jurisdiction of the federal district courts is controlling).
41. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907.
42. Id. at 908, (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 912-13.
45. Id. at 912.
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tion.46 Thus, the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit were in basic
accord regarding the legislative history and scope of section 526.47
The D.C. Circuit in COPIAT went on to hold, again consistent
with Vivitar, that Customs' interpretation of the statute "does not dis-
play the necessary thoroughness, validity and consistency to merit
judicial acceptance." 48 This conclusion was based not only upon the
Service's actual practices, but also upon the failure of that agency to
offer a consistent and careful explanation of "exactly what purpose the
regulations serve." 49 Similarly, the court summarily rejected the
"implied ratification" argument, 50 citing the Vivitar court's statement
that "[legislation by total silence is too tenuous a theory to merit
extended discussion." 51
The COPIAT and Vivitar courts represent agreement on the his-
tory and interpretation of section 526. The two courts, however, dis-
agreed on the propriety of the regulations as an exercise of Customs'
enforcement discretion. 52 The Vivitar court held that the regulations
lawfully "defined Customs' role in initiating administrative enforce-
ment of the statute. ' 53 The COPIAT court, however, declared that
"the Customs Service has never purported to justify these regulations
as an exercise of enforcement discretion .... Thus, this case simply
does not raise the question of whether the Customs Service could
refrain from excluding certain grey market goods as an exercise of
enforcement discretion."'54 The COPIAT court found that Customs
"regarded the regulations as its interpretation of what the law requires
rather than as a decision not to prosecute to the letter of the law."'55
46. The court conceded that "the debate [in Congress] does not unequivocally resolve
all the questions about the scope of § 526." Id. However, the D.C. Circuit found that the
subsequent legislative history, including the reenactment of the statute in identical form,
demonstrated Congress's understanding that "[§ 526] applied to all situations literally
within its terms." Id. at 913.
47. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). In United States v. 89 Bottles of Eau de Joy, 797 F.2d 767,
770 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit concurred with the D.C. and Federal Circuit views
on some aspects of the legislative history debate.
48. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Sena-
torial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981)).
49. Id. at 915; see infra notes 97-103, 136-41 and accompanying text. The COPIAT
court was quite critical of Customs, referring to Customs' actions at times as presenting
"another curious turn in the sixty years of... administration of [§ 526]." Id. at 916. The
Court also described Customs' justifications as "poorly articulated and vacillating." Id.
50. Id. at 917.
51. Id. (citing Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
53. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
54. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918. Because the COPIAT court held that the regulations
were not an exercise of enforcement discretion, it left open the extent to which Customs
could refrain from excluding certain gray market goods as an exercise of enforcement dis-
cretion. Id.
55. Id.
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Because the COPIA T court held that Customs' interpretation of sec-
tion 526 was inconsistent with the statute and found no other rationale
for upholding the regulations, the court declared the regulations
unlawful.5 6
Several reasons could be advanced for this last aspect of the
COPIAT decision. The most logical seems to be a desire to avoid
direct conflict with Vivitar, while at the same time demonstrating a
commitment to judicial restraint not practiced by the Federal Circuit.
The motivation to avoid direct conflict with Vivitar might flow from
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Vivitar; the latter motiva-
tion (judicial restraint) may stem from the conservative make-up of
the COPIAT panel.57 In any event, the results in the two cases are
clearly at odds.
C. OLYMPUS
One month after the D.C. Circuit decided COPIAT, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Customs regulation under section
526, but on grounds rejected in both Vivitar and COPIAT.58 In Olym-
pus Corp. v. United States,59 Judge Oakes affirmed the judgment of the
Eastern District of New York.60 The Second Circuit relied heavily on
56. Id. The plaintiffs also requested an injunction, barring Customs from enforcing the
regulations and ordering them "to enforce the statute its fullest." Id. The D.C. Circuit,
however, refused to issue the injunction because of the broad degree of continuing supervi-
sion that would be required.
57. Two members of the three-judge panel, Judges Silberman and Bork, were
appointed by President Reagan. Judge Bork, in particular, is well known for his conserva-
tive views.
58. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit
had previously decided two cases involving gray market goods. The first, Sturges v. Clark
D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931), involved the importation, by an individual, of a
.trademarked automobile for his personal use. The court in Sturges held that § 526
presented an absolute bar to such importations. In 1978, Congress reversed the particular
result of Sturges by amending § 526 to provide an exemption for goods imported into the
United States by individuals "when such articles are for his personal use and not for sale."
19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982). The other Second Circuit case involving gray market goods
was Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). In Bell & Howell, a
U.S. trademark owner sought to enjoin the sale of gray market goods already imported into
the United States. The Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's decision did not
address § 526, but rather required the plaintiff to prove irreparable injury before a prelimi-
nary injunction could be properly issued. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision
in Bell & Howell, see Lipner, supra note 1, at 564-65.
59. 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
60. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The district
court, in an opinion written by Judge Sifton, upheld Customs' gray market regulation for
much the same reasons advanced by Judge Restani of the Court of International Trade in
Vivitar and the District Court opinion in COPIAT. Id. at 920-22. Judge Sifton also
declared that the courts, not Customs, should make the initial and ultimate decision about
exclusion of gray market goods. Id. at 920-21; see also infra notes 98-133 and accompany-
ing text.
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the "implied ratification by Congress" argument, 61 which had been
given short shrift by the Vivitar and COPIA T courts.6 2 Speaking for a
divided court, Judge Oakes adopted the Court of International Trade's
account of section 526 legislative history,63 but declined to rely on that
alone as the basis for his decision. 64 Nor did he base his decision
solely on the "long-standing enforcement" theory. 65 Judge Oakes dis-
agreed with the Federal Circuit in Vivitar, concluding that the regula-
tions were sufficiently consistent to constitute a long-standing
administrative interpretation of section 526.66 He noted, however,
that reassessment of the regulations was appropriate in light of
changes in antitrust policy. 67 Despite Judge Oakes' view that the reg-
ulations were of "questionable wisdom,"' 68 the Second Circuit never-
theless upheld them in view of "congressional acquiescence in the
long-standing administrative interpretation of [section 526, which]
legitimates that interpretation as an exercise of Customs' enforcement
discretion."' 69 The Second Circuit's rationale thus seems to amalga-
mate the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit reason-
ing in Vivitar. The Second Circuit found that the myriad variations of
the gray market, 70 combined with the "administrative difficulties
inherent in requiring the Customs Service to exclude gray market
goods make clear why Customs has long and consistently interpreted
[section 526] to allow it to refuse to exclude the goods."'71 The Olym-
pus court contended that because exclusion of gray market goods must
be based upon adjudication of the merits of individual cases, the Cus-
toms regulations represented a valid exercise of enforcement discre-
61. Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 920-21.
62. See supra notes 25, 50-51 and accompanying text.
63. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319 (citing Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420,
426-28 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)).
64. Id. Judge Oakes' decision is thus consistent with Second Circuit precedent. See
Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931).
65. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319-20. Although one purpose in enacting § 526 was to
reverse the Katzel decision, the scope of § 526 was not limited to the Katzel facts.
66. Id. at 319; see supra note 25. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit
adopted by reference the Federal Circuit's statement of the factual history of the regula-
tions, while disagreeing with that court's conclusions regarding consistency. Olympus, 792
F.2d at 319.
67. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319-20. But see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
68. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
69. Id.
70. The Olympus Court cited the Federal Circuit's description in Vivitar of the numer-
ous variations of the gray market:
United States claim to foreign trademark rights may be owned by the same entity,
by related companies, or by wholly separate companies; imported goods may be
identical to or different from the parallel import; the goods may be produced
abroad; service and warranties may or may not be the same; foreign licensees may
not be subject to U.S. control.
Id. at 320 (citing Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
71. Id.
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tion.72 An absolute rule of exclusion would cause Customs to "expend
resources excluding goods [which should not be excluded] ... [and]
place the Customs Service 'in the position of having to determine at
the time of border crossing' whether the [U.S.] trademark holder
[could prove the requisites of trademark infringement]. ' 73 Accord-
ingly, Judge Oakes held that regulations "only limit[ed] Customs obli-
gation to enforce [section 526] by excluding goods" and did not define
the scope of section 526 protection. 74 Notwithstanding Customs fail-
ure to exclude gray market goods, the domestic markholder could pur-
sue a private right of action against the importer under section 526.75
The court in Olympus was split 2-1 with Judge Ralph Winter dis-
senting.76 Judge Winter agreed generally with the D.C. Circuit's
views in COPIAT.77 He criticized his brethren for relying on "admin-
istrative difficulties," 78 stating that literal enforcement of section 526
"is simplicity itself."79 He then criticized all concerned:
The fact is that the Customs Service has over the years justified this regulation
with arguments of opportunity tailored to whatever audience it happened to be
addressing at the time. This is hardly unusual administrative behavior,
although the degree of vacillation in this case is somewhat exceptional. The
fact that courts may indulge in fiction in the area of administrative law more
often than in any other field does not mean, however, that we cannot insist
upon coherent fiction.
s0
On December 8, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
to COPIAT. The Supreme Court's decision in COPIAT will likely
resolve the conflicts among the circuits regarding legislative history,
implied ratification, and the bona fides of the Custom Service's prac-
tice. The Supreme Court can, however, avoid becoming embroiled in
the details of the controversy while at the same time resolving the con-
flicts among the circuits by reversing COPIAT without opinion.
Although that result would leave open the jurisdictional question as
well as the appropriate rationale underlying Customs' practices,
COPIAI's requirements that Customs literally enforce section 526
would be overturned, thereby allowing the lower courts to get on with
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 921 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); see also infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
74. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting).
77. Id. Judge Winter did, however, find the "legislative history to be somewhat more
ambiguous than [did Judge Silberman in COPIAT]." Id.
78. Id. Judge Winter stated that these "purported administrative difficulties appear to
be recently created ... to defend litigation in the 1980's." Id.
79. Id. "Difficulties stemming from variations in grey market relationships or from a
supposed need to find a mark's existing domestic goodwill arise only after determining that
[§ 526] does not exclude all grey market goods." Id.
80. Id.
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the real merits of gray market litigation. For reasons discussed in this
Article, a broad decision upholding COPIAT would be unwise and
might even spur Congressional action. Rather than addressing the
likely resolution of the technical legal issues of section 526 enforce-
ment, this Article will instead turn to the problem of devising a logical
and rational approach to at-the-border enforcement of gray market
infringement.
III. A RATIONAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL SOLUTION
In 1984, in an article about the trademark and antitrust issues
involved in parallel import cases, this author observed that "for the
most part, the courts have declined to decide... cases based upon an
interpretation of [section 526]."81 The past, however, is not always a
valid basis upon which to forecast the future. In the two years since
that statement was made, the courts of appeals have issued three
major, and apparently contradictory, decisions directly bearing upon
the interpretation of section 526. The Federal Circuit's decisions in
Vivitar, the D.C. Circuit's in COPIAT, and the Second Circuit's in
Olympus, are facially inconsistent, but worse yet, inconclusive. Very
little has been settled, and even the question of which tribunal has
jurisdiction to decide the issue remains murky at best.
The various rationales advanced by these courts present a check-
erboard of conflicting answers. 82 For example, the Customs Service's
rationale for its current regulations were adopted by the Court of
International Trade, but were rejected by both the Courts of Appeals
81. Lipner, supra note 1, at 575.
82. The following chart represents the dispositions of the various theories and the ulti-
mate outcomes:
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for the Federal Circuit and the District of Columbia.83 The D.C. Cir-
cuit rejected the Federal Circuit's rationale for upholding the Customs
Service's regulations on the grounds that Customs never advanced
such an argument. 84 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, upheld
the regulations, seemingly combining elements of the rationales offered
by the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.85
In condemning the regulations in COPIAT, Judge Silberman of
the D.C. Circuit was the only judge to recite the public policy argu-
ments of the gray market sellers.8 6 Judge Silberman conceded that
long-standing
Legislative agency
history practice
implied
ratification by
Congress
agency regs.
discretion upheld?
Vivitar
CIT yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) not discussed yes (1)
(1 judge)
Vivitar no (4)
Fed. Cir. not proper yes (1) no (4) yes (5) yes (5)
(5 judges) to go into(l) no (4) not proper (1)
COPIAT
D.D.C. yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) not discussed yes (1)
(1 judge)
COPIAT
D.C. Cir. no (3) no (3) no (3) no (3) no (3)
(3 judges)
OLYMPUS
E.D.N.Y. yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) not discussed yes (1)
(1 judge)
OLYMPUS
2d Cir. no (3) yes (2) yes (2) yes (2) yes (2-1)
(3 judges) no (1) no (1) no (I)
(14 judges yes (3) yes (6) yes (5) yes (7) yes (10)
total) no (10) no (8) no (8) no (4) no (4)
As the chart indicates, three judges (all trial level) upheld the regulations on the basis of the
legislative history of the statute, while four rejected this theory. Thirty-eight percent (5 out of
13) of the judges who addressed the implied ratification issue accepted it. The long-standing
agency practice argument faired slightly better. See supra note 25. A majority, 64 percent, of the
judges accepted the agency discretion argument. Finally, a majority of the judges, 71 percent,
upheld the regulations.
83. See supra notes 25, 46, 49.
84. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8,
1986) (No. 86-625).
85. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
86. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917. Arguments advanced by gray market sellers are lower
consumer prices, lack of reciprocity in trade laws of other countries, and the change in
business conditions since 1922. Id. at 917-18.
Theories/Cases
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gray market sellers might have valid concerns,87 but he insisted that
these arguments could be addressed only by Congress; any court role
in that decision would be improper.88 Furthermore, he termed Cus-
toms' attempts to develop a selective policy "dubious, '8 9 and sug-
gested that the exercise of agency discretion might be an unlawful
"abdication." 90 The Second Circuit also suggested that a change in
Customs' practices might be wise in light of recent antitrust develop-
ments,91 but concluded that "change is a matter for the legislative or
executive branch not the judiciary." 92 Yet, history has demonstrated
that Congress is highly unlikely to act on major gray market issues.93
Unfortunately, legal battles about gray market issues will continue
into the foreseeable future.94 It therefore seems up to the judiciary,
whether it likes to or not, to fashion a sound approach to this subject.
B. THE STARTING POINT: VIVITAR
Throughout the confusion, the most rational opinion concerning
section 526 remains that of the Federal Circuit in Vivitar.95 That
court's decision that the Customs Service's regulations are a proper
exercise of agency discretion is a realistic view of a difficult situation.
It is hard to fault Customs for its years of wavering enforcement
of section 526. Businesses, judges, and commentators have long had
difficulty defining the issues, let alone resolving the gray market situa-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 918. On June 26th, Senator John Chafee introduced legislation to codify the
Customs regulations on the enforcement of § 526. S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986),
reprinted in Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 32, at 235, 247-48 (July 17, 1986).
Stating that U.S. consumers save billions of dollars because of the availability of gray mar-
ket goods, Senator Chafee insisted that Congressional action was "vitally needed" and
should not be left to further litigation that "could take years and leave the matter highly
uncertain in the interim." Id. at 297. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Trade, which held an initial hearing on July 29. Id. at 296-97. No further hearings
were scheduled. Id. at 297; see infra note 93.
89. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917. The court was specifically referring to Customs'
attempts to infuse antitrust concerns into the rationale for its regulations.
90. Id. at 918 n.16. The court stated that the issue was not directly raised, and there-
fore the court was not bound to decide it.
91. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); see infra notes 100-
02 and accompanying text.
92. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 321 (footnote omitted).
93. See Lipner, supra note 1, at 560. The issues involved have been considered too
sensitive, too complex, or too esoteric to retain the attention of the U.S. Congress. How-
ever, if the Supreme Court upholds the D.C. Circuit's decision in COPIAT, Congress may
be spurred into action to codify Customs' practices to avoid literal enforcement of § 526.
94. The new basis for attack is to challenge the gray market seller's title to the goods,
claiming that the title was procurred by fraud in the inducement. See, ag., Johnson &
Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
95. The District Court's opinion in Olympus represents an insighful analysis of these
problems. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 920-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see
infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
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tion. The Vivitar holding that district courts must decide gray market
disputes on a "case-by-case basis" is a rational and proper solution to
a complex problem.96
The D.C. Circuit in COPIAT criticized the Federal Circuit's con-
clusion in Vivitar that the regulations represented a valid exercise of
enforcement discretion by Customs. Judge Silberman rejected the
Federal Circuit's rationale because "the Customs Service has never
purported to justify these regulations as an exercise of enforcement
discretion .... -97 It is difficult to fault Customs for not asserting that
rationale more forcefully, even after its adoption by the Federal Cir-
cuit in Vivitar, because that would present only yet another inconsis-
tency in a scheme Customs has long tried to represent as being
consistent.
C. ANTITRUST CONCERNS
The real reason for Customs' selective enforcement of section 526
is based on antitrust law, an area in which Customs has no real juris-
diction.98 For a variety of reasons, Customs no longer chooses to jus-
tify its actions based on antitrust policy.9 9 However, by attempting to
justify its regulations without regard to antitrust, Customs reduced its
chances of persuading the appellate courts, even though the other
arguments had been accepted by a handful of lower courts. 10
The Customs regulations make sense from an antitrust viewpoint.
An absolute bar to gray market imports would create an outright
restricted distribution scheme at the expense of independents-a result
that may be illegal even after the Supreme Court's decision in Conti-
nental T V, Inc. v. G. TE. Sylvania, Inc. 101 In particular, an illegal
96. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1791 (1986).
97. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8,
1986) (No. 86-625).
98. Id. at 916-17.
99. Id. at 916. Among these reasons are: (1) the antitrust rationale is very similar to
Customs' practices criticized in United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), vacated and remanded 358 U.S. 915 (1958), action dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); and (2) antitrust doctrine has changed since the Guerlain decision. The
Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), rejected the previous per se analysis of domestic vertical non-price restraints in
favor of a rule-of-reason approach. In light of these changes in antitrust doctrine, the dis-
trict court in Osawa stated that "[a]ntitrust questions are far too complex to be reasonably
decided [by the simple criteria contained in the Customs regvlations]." Osawa & Co. v. B.
& H. Photo, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See generally Lipner, supra
note 1, at 557-60; see also Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
100. See supra note 82.
101. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). This decision changed antitrust law regarding restrictive distri-
bution systems from a per se approach to a more lenient rule-of-reason approach. See
supra note 99. Nevertheless, in certain situations, restrictive or exclusive distribution
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restricted distribution scheme might result if the distributor seeking
exclusivity is owned or controlled by some firm higher up in the distri-
bution system.102 Regardless of whether one agrees with this conclu-
sion, further factual analysis is required to determine whether antitrust
concerns truly exist.10 3 Because of the complex antitrust issues
involved, it is clear that Customs cannot and should not undertake
that analysis. 1°4 Rather, a detailed analysis by a court of competent
jurisdiction is necessary to determine whether antitrust concerns are
implicated in a particular gray market case.
D. THE PRODUCT APPROACH: GOODWILL AND OWNERSHIP
The question of whether to exclude gray market imports raises
other complex issues. Trademark infringement and the likelihood of
product confusion in gray market cases require detailed and rigorous
factual analysis.105 Neither section 526 nor the applicable regulations
remains unlawful. See Lipner, Restricted Distribution at the FTC.: Rule of Reason or Reign
of Chaos?, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 309 (1984); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Restraints
Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1985) [hereinafter Guidelines].
102. See, e.g., Graphic Products Distrib., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (1lth Cir.
1983); see also Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982); Note, Dual Distribu-
tion and The Horizontal-Vertical Dichotomy of Nonprice Restrictions, 17 TULSA L.J. 306
(1981). But see Guidelines, supra note 101, at 6265.
103. This author has previously argued that insufficient attention is paid to antitrust
aspects of these cases particularly in the way costs and benefits of legal restrictions on gray
market importations are evaluated. See Lipner, supra note 1, at 569-71; see also Guerlain,
155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely
Marked Goods Is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959) (parallel
import problem involves antitrust issues more than trademark issues); cf. Coalition to Pre-
serve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 916
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cerL granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625) ("we
express no view as to how antitrust analysis bearing on domestic vertical arrangements
applies to the extraterritorial arrangements present in this case"); Model Rectifier Corp. v.
Takachiho Int'l, 709 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1983), 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (May 18, 1983)
(insufficient proof of relevant market to make antitrust determination); see also Note, supra
note 34, at 104-06; Note, Importation Control Under Tariff Act Section 526: Trademark
Privileges and Antitrust Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 1110 (1958); cf. Olympus Corp. v. United
States, 792 F.2d 315, 319-20 (2d Cir. 1986) (recent developments in antitrust "would seem
to make reassessment of [§ 133.21(c)] appropriate at least insofar as those regulations rest
on antitrust considerations"); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063, 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (criticizing Guerlain, but not addressing directly the
antitrust aspects of the case before it.).
104. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320 (Customs would have to expend a great amount of
resources to determine if a manufacturer "was merely engaging in price discrimination or
other behavior questionable as a matter of antitrust law"); COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917 (Cus-
toms does not possess "the authority to infuse antitrust concerns into Section 526...").
105. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see
also, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 711 (D.N.J. 1985), appeal
docketed, Nos. 85-5187 & 86-5207 (3d Cir. July 7, 1986) ("I do not believe that the percent-
age of ownership should determine whether a separate goodwill [a key to trademark
infringement] has been developed.... The question is a factual one"); Osawa & Co. v. B.
& H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (In reaching its decision the court delved
deeply into particular facts that demonstrated harm to the plaintiff and consumer confu-
sion); see generally infra notes 108-36 and accompanying text.
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make any attempt even to address these important issues. 10 6 Although
logical and straightforward analysis of trademark infringement and
consumer confusion issues are difficult to achieve, two district court
cases have presented a rational analytical framework. 107 In Osawa &
Co. v. B & H Photo, 10 8 Judge Leval of the Southern District of New
York emphasized the point-of-sale efforts of the authorized United
States sellers of trademarked medium-format cameras, and the injuries
that would result from free-riding by gray-marketeers. 10 9 The author-
ized sellers in Osawa engaged in advertising, promotion, and product
servicing that caused the public to identify the trademarks in question
with those dealers, independent of any public association with the for-
eign manufacturer. 110 Judge Leval stated that the authorized seller's
conduct created "factually independent goodwill."'' As a result of
this "factually independent goodwill," the court found that the
authorized sellers actually and directly incurred consumer ire because
of purchases made from certain gray market sellers, and that this con-
sumer ire was sufficient to produce redressable injury. 1 2
In Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash," 3 Judge Debevoise relied
106. Nor should they, as the resolution of such issues is properly within the province of
the judiciary. See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 921; see also infra text accompanying notes
141-42.
107. Weil, 618 F. Supp. 700; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1163.
108. 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
109. Id. at 1166-68. For a detailed discussion, see Lipner, supra note 1, at 565-66, 572-
75.
110. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1173-74.
111. Id. at 1174. Judge Leval discussed briefly the principle known as trademark
"exhaustion," under which a trademark owner may not control marked goods after releas-
ing them into the stream of commerce. Id. at 1173-74. After the initial sale by the trade-
mark owner, his rights are deemed exhausted; downstream sellers are free to advertise,
display, and otherwise sell the goods, so long as they do not represent themselves as author-
ized. Judge Leval held, however, that if the U.S. trademark owner has developed its own
goodwill, independent of the foreign seller, "whatever exhaustion occurred with the origi-
nal release into commerce was the exhaustion of a legally distinct and factually different
mark." Id. at 1174. It is worth examining whether the exhaustion doctrine should apply in
spite of the presence of local goodwill when the U.S. trademark owner is owned or con-
trolled by the foreign seller. The cases, unfortunately, make no mention of this question; its
answer therefore seems problematic at best. Cf. Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Cus-
toms Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding, inter alia, that "since
[p]laintiff's international enterprise" was originally compensated for the goods, no trade-
mark rights should be enforced). Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 711 (local goodwill is the determin-
ing factor, and the "relationship of different markholders does not, in and of itself, preclude
them from developing independent goodwill).
112. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168; see also, Lipner, supra note 1, at 568-69, wherein it
was suggested that factually independent goodwill might have become analogized to the
concept of secondary meaning, a concept which trademark law has long known. As will be
demonstrated, the standards for determining the existence of "factually independent good-
will" are not well developed, and the secondary meaning concept might be a useful tool in
that regard. Nevertheless, the goodwill concept can be developed fully along lines herein
suggested. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
113. 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
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on the Osawa decision in holding that the plaintiff in Weil had estab-
lished the right to a Customs ban on gray market imports of
LLADRO porcelain figurines.114 Judge Debevoise framed the issue
before the court as "whether the United States markholder has devel-
oped the goodwill of the product in the United States or whether it has
merely relied upon the mark's international goodwill."11 5 Where the
domestic markholder has developed a domestic goodwill, gray market
goods could confuse purchasers, injure the authorized sellers, and thus
infringe upon the U.S. markholder's rights. Judge Debevoise rea-
soned, however, that if no independent goodwill exists, then consum-
ers would not be confused if they associated authorized and
nonauthorized (gray market) goods with the same source, L e., the for-
eign manufacturer. In the latter cases, the local authorized seller
would sustain no independent injury. 116 The court found that
LLADRO products were virtually unknown in the United States
when Weil, the authorized seller, began to import them.1 17 Weil made
considerable promotional efforts,11 8 and used its own name in promot-
ing LLADRO products.119 The court concluded that Weil "stands
behind the porcelain which it sells by exchanging any piece having an
imperfection.... It is the entity which insures their quality. '1 20 The
authorized seller had thus established local, independent goodwill.1 21
Although a trial was arguably warranted, 122 Judge Debevoise ruled
that "no genuine issue of material fact was raised,"1 23 and granted
Weil's motion for summary judgment on the issue of infringement. 124
Unfortunately, the Weil opinion stressed that although Lladro
S.A. (the manufacturer of the imported products) owned Weil, 125 that
114. Id.
115. Id. at 711. Judge Debevoise, like Judge Leval in Osawa, reached this conclusion
through application of the exhaustion doctrine. See supra note 111.
116. Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 711.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 712.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 713. Dash argues that even though Weil may insure the quality of LLADRO
products in the U.S., it is not the only organization which does so. Brief for Appellant, at
32, Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, appeal docketed, Nos. 86-5187 & 86-5207 (3d Cir.
July 7, 1986).
121. In deciding Weil, Judge Debevoise cited Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Cus-
toms Service, 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983), as an example of a case where no local
goodwill had been established. Well, 618 F. Supp. at 709-11.
122. Dash argues, with enough logic to merit a full trial, and perhaps even to prevail as
a matter of law, that Weil's efforts establish no customer recognition of Weil as the sole
U.S. source of LLADRO products. Brief for Appellant, supra note 120, at 28-36, 39-40.
123. Well, 618 F. Supp. at 713.
124. Id. at 718. Judge Debevoise's analysis has been cited approvingly by the Third
Circuit. See Premier Dental Products Co. v. Danby Dental Supply Co., appeal docketed,
No. 85-1468 (3rd Cir. June 24, 1986).
125. Well, 618 F. Supp. at 706-7.
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fact "should [not] determine whether a separate goodwill has been
developed. ' 126 This assertion seems dubious, however, not because of
section 526, its legislative history, or the recent judicial decisions inter-
preting it, but rather because common ownership or control suggests
an attempt to create a single, global goodwill.
When common ownership or control is present, a single, global
goodwill may, in fact, be cheaper and easier to develop. Certainly
there would be no need to maintain the sometimes burdensome indicia
of corporate and marketing separateness. Additionally, a global good-
will could be especially valuable in some situations. For example, a
certain manufacturer might wish to stress global product consis-
tency; 127 alternatively, a manufacturer might wish to emphasize the
foreign or international character of the goods or organizations
involved. 128
Because the essence of a trademark is that goods so represented
come from "a single, albeit anonymous source,"' 29 it is unclear why a
single, global enterprise would feel the need to create a separate, local
goodwill. 130 Genuine products sold under a single trademark are usu-
ally substantially the same whether they are intended to be sold here
or abroad. 131 In contrast to such product characteristics, ancillary
point-of-sale services, provided by markholders, may vary from coun-
try to country or from seller to seller. The only logical explanation for
development of a separate goodwill, aside from a desire to impress
courts in gray market cases, is that the U.S. authorized distributor
wishes to stress to consumers that it will provide point-of-sale services
that are not offered by the foreign manufacturer or foreign authorized
sellers. 132 Unless the U.S. authorized seller can prove that the gray
market products are truly different from the authorized ones, advertis-
ing that merely stresses product characteristics cannot suffice to estab-
lish local goodwill. On the other hand, the provision and advertising
126. Id. at 711. Judge Debevoise then added, parenthetically, "To the extent that
Parfums may be read to require such a simplistic analysis, I would disagree." Id.
127. For example, the manufacturer may want to stress that the goods are the same as
those sold in Europe.
128. Perfumes are an example of such a product. See, e.g., Parfums Stem, Inc. v.
United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 420 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
129. Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 712.
130. Because the fate of the U.S. authorized seller is inextricably tied to that of the
foreign manufacturer, it is unclear why the U.S. entity would wish to distance itself from
the foreign seller.
131. In some cases, such as automobiles, there may be some differences between the
foreign and U.S. products. But in general, with the exception of warranties, the authorized
and gray market products are physically the same. Furthermore, one needs to take care
that any differences are not fabricated attempts to curtail gray market sales. See, e.g., Stu-
art, Auto Group Fights Anti-Theft Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at D4, col. 1.
132. Such an argument is being made by Dash in its pending appeal of the Well case.
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 120, at 37.
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of point-of-sale services such as warranty repair, maintenance of an
inventory of spare, auxiliary or complimentary parts, employment of
trained sales personnel, or detailed inspection for defects of all prod-
ucts sold would logically be relevant to the establishment of a separate
goodwill.
To determine whether an independent goodwill had been estab-
lished, the nature of the product is thus an important factor for courts
to consider. Development of a local goodwill makes business sense
where the product consists of a combination of hardware and service,
i.e., where the nature of the product dictates the need for an inventory
of spare, auxilliary or complimentary articles, or employment of
trained sales personnel; or where the product is such that subsequent
repair services might be needed. 133 But, where the product is a simple
article of commerce, where point-of-sale services are not demanded by
consumers nor provided by sellers, development of a local goodwill
would be superfluous. Cameras, autos, and dental equipment are
examples of products that will probably require local goodwill.134 On
the other hand, perfume, clothing, batteries, and even porcelain figu-
rines generally will not need point-of-sale service.135 In the latter
types of products, because point-of-sale services are generally unneces-
sary, free-riding by gray market sellers is unlikely to exist. The likeli-
hood of damage to the U.S. trademark owner appears remote in those
cases, and a bar to gray market imports is therefore unnecessary.
Judge Debevoise's opinion in Weil, while laudable in many other
respects, falls short on this aspect of the analysis.13
6
133. This mode of analysis is analogous to analyzing, in an antitrust context, whether a
given product is subject to the free-rider effect. See Lipner, supra note 101, at 332-33.
134. See Premier Dental Products Co. v. Danby Dental Co., appeal docketed, No. 85-
1468 (3d Cir. June 24, 1986); see also Model Rectifier v. Takachiho Int'l, 709 F.2d 1517
(9th Cir. 1983) (radio-controlled model cars).
135. See, e.g., El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe Work, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1038,
1392-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l, 707 F.2d 1054, 1058
(9th Cir. 1983). A word of caution might be necessary where high-priced perfumes are
involved. Image-enhancing advertising can produce protectable goodwill, especially when
the unauthorized imports are being sold through discount sellers. This fact, in itself, can
hamper sales to image-conscious consumers.
136. The opinion does, however, delve into the question of quality control, and point-of-
sale services, which logic dictates to be necessary when dealing with porcelain figurines.
Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 711-12 (D.N.J. 1985), appeal
docketed, Nos. 85-5187 & 86-5207 (3d Cir. June 7, 1986). There seemed to be some issue,
however, about the quality of Weil's actual inspection efforts. But see Brief for Appellant,
supra note 120. Nevertheless, the Weil decision, like that in Osawa, tended to concentrate
more on questions of warranty. See Well, 618 F. Supp. at 712-14; Osawa & Co. v. B. & H.
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1166-69, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). One must be careful not to
make the determination of the nature of the product from its price alone. For example,
film is a relatively inexpensive product, yet if it is not handled and stored properly, it can
quickly lose its valuable properties. This is also a case where a warrant is largely irrelevant.
If the film does not take quality photographs, the user will nevertheless be upset even if a
warranty (to return the purchase price) is ultimately honored.
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Product nature is not the only issue involved in this analytical
framework. In situations where common ownership or control is pres-
ent, a different kind of solution to the gray market riddle is possible.
The trademark owner in the gray market setting is merely trying, for
whatever reason, to enforce a restricted distribution scheme. 137 If the
trademark owner also owns or controls the foreign source, the most
efficient solution is for the U.S. entity to privately enforce its
scheme. 138 Rather than rely on the U.S. Customs Service to exclude
genuine goods, the trademark owner should have the burden of track-
ing down the diverters, and requiring the foreign distributors to stop
selling goods to them. Alternatively, the trademark owner could bring
a private suit under section 526, alleging damages caused by gray mar-
ket sales.' 39 But regardless of the outcome of such suits, it would be
an unwise expenditure of scarce government resources for Customs to
expend public funds to police a private worldwide distribution scheme
that could instead be policed privately.
Accordingly, the regulations represent the type of enforcement
discretion that a prudent government would want Customs to make.
The agency discretion argument is therefore quite persuasive.' 40 On
the other hand, Customs' strict enforcement of section 526 is probably
proper where common ownership and control do not exist. In situa-
tions where common ownership and control are lacking, enforcement
of a restricted distribution scheme would become more difficult, if not
impossible. In these instances, government intervention is the only
way to protect authorized U.S. sellers. The factual situations in Katzel
and Osawa are good examples of situations where government inter-
vention would be proper.14' However, common ownership or control
occurs with much greater frequency. Therefore, to merit government
intervention, a complaining U.S. trademark owner must meet three
conditions. First, a U.S. trademark owner must demonstrate that it
has no power to discipline the foreign diverters through private
enforcement. Second, the U.S. trademark owner must then prove that
it does have a local goodwill, independent of the public's association
with the foreign trademark. By proving these two elements, the U.S.
trademark owner has shown not only that injury is likely, but also that
137. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03; Lipner, supra note 1, at 569-71, 573-75.
138. See Lipner, supra note 1, at 576 n.188; Vandenburgh, supra note 103.
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (1982).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 26-36, 53-56, 69-75.
141. A. Boujois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923). In Katzel, the U.S. trademark owner had purchased, for a considerable sum, the
trademark and goodwill of the foreign manufacturer, and was truly an independent entity.
Id. at 539. Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Osawa,
there was found to be only 7 percent common ownership. See Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co.
v. Masel, 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Lipner, supra note I, at 563 n.78.
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he needs government assistance in combatting the problem. Third,
before the court can grant relief, the trademark owner must persuade
the court that no antitrust concerns exist. Only after all these condi-
tions have been met should Customs be enlisted to protect the U.S.
trademark owner.
The district courts, not Customs, should make the determination
whether to exclude gray market goods. Customs' regulations regard-
ing common ownership and control would play a proper role at the
outset of the determination. The courts, however, have properly
refused to allow Customs to make the difficult factual determinations
on antitrust and trademark issues. 142
With the exception of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, almost
all courts have held that section 526 protection in most situations is
not available until trademark infringement has been established. 1
43
Although the D.C. Circuit in COPIAT held that section 526 was an
absolute bar to gray market imports, that court's decision did not pre-
clude judicial review of the merits of a particular exclusion. 144 One of
the potential results of a literal enforcement of section 526 is the possi-
bility of an extreme variant in gray market litigation: the gray market
importers will be the plaintiff, and the authorized sellers the defend-
ants, with the gray market goods resting outside our borders during
the pendency of the litigation. The troublesome aspect of that scena-
rio is that exclusion would automatically result merely from trade-
142. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 920-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
However, the D.C. Circuit in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W.
3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625), in effect mandated that Customs make yet another
interpretation of its role under § 526. The COPIAT court appears to ask Customs to make
a decision in favor of literal enforcement of § 526 that it is obviously unprepared and
unwilling to make. Customs had solicited economic data on the gray market in 1984, but
the submissions were sparse and no action was taken. Furthermore, literal enforcement of
§ 526 seems to be unpalatable to the Reagan Administration, as the Duracell case suggests.
Literal enforcement would be unfortunate, because § 526 makes no reference to either
trademark or antitrust principles, thus providing a remedy where no real injury necessarily
exists. The Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in COPIAT may resolve this issue.
However, in view of the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Federal Circuit's decision in
Vivitar, a reversal of COPIA T may be likely. While some of the members of the Rehnquist
court may be sympathetic to the viewpoints of Judges Silberman and Winter, see supra note
57 and accompanying text, they could not muster the four votes required to take certiorari
in Vivitar, and presumably overturn that decision. The best prediction is, therefore, that
COPIAT will, in some form or another, be overturned.
143. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985),
appeal docketed, Nos. 85-5187 & 86-5207 (3d Cir. July 7, 1986); Osawa & Co. v. B & H-
Photo., 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs
Service, 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
144. The D.C. Circuit, for instance, expressly stated that it was making no findings on
how antitrust bears on gray market issues. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916 n.15. Similarly, it left
open the question of the extent of permissible agency enforcement discretion under § 526.
Id. at 918.
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mark registration, even though that registration does not require the
existence of a factually independent goodwill.
The courts, in contrast, require proof of a factually independent
goodwill as a prerequisite to exclusion. 145 The burden of proof rests
with the U.S. trademark owner. It seems anomolous that the author-
ized seller (the defendant under COPIAT) will receive the benefit of
the doubt at the border by obtaining automatic exclusion, but will nev-
ertheless have to carry the burden of proof in court that the exclusion
was proper. Such a situation might be analogized to receiving a tem-
porary injunction without prior proof of a likelihood of success on the
merits, a result which must be viewed as untenable. In cases where a
court will ultimately find the exclusion unwarranted, Customs will
have incorrectly spent scarce funds, distorted the marketplace and
caused unnecessary hardship on importers, retailers and consumers. 4 6
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should reverse the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in COPIAT. Failing Supreme Court reversal of the
decision, Congress should ratify Customs' practices as a prudential
response to the complex gray market situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even in the face of the Supreme Court grant of certiorari in
COPIAT, the recent flurry of judicial activity indicates that a solution
to the gray market riddle is not certain. One can only hope that the
lower courts will now avoid deciding cases based upon section 526 and
its regulations, and return to individual factual determinations of the
issues in each gray market case. As numerous cases, as well as logic,
demonstrate, creation of any kind of sweeping bar to gray market
imports is unwise and is likely to produce inequitable results. Never-
theless, Customs' regulations, which take into account questions of
ownership or control, present a rational approach to at-the-border
enforcement. 147 Put simply, it would be difficult for the Customs Ser-
145. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986); Osawa, 589
F. Supp. at 1174.
146. During the pendency of the litigation, consumers could be deprived of the benefits
of gray market competition such as lower prices. Retailers who sell gray market goods
might not be able to operate their busineses, and might even fail. Finally, if such failures
did occur, consumers who had previously purchased goods from those sellers might be
deprived of valuable warranties.
147. In situations of common ownership or control, Customs' current regulations are
effective in the area of trademark and antitrust while taking into account both fiscal and
budget policies. Customs will enforce § 526 when the regulations so indicate. For exam-
ple, in United States v. 89 Bottles of Eau de Joy, 797 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1986), Customs
seized and destroyed certain gray market perfume. The lower court had found that there
was no common ownership of effective control between the U.S. licensee and the foreign
manufacturer. The court was careful to express no view on the validity of the Customs
regulations. Id. at 770 n.2. The Ninth Circuit did, however, reject the district court's view
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vice to do better, and unwise for it to go further. The courts also seem
to be on the right track in many respects, although refinement of the
test for local goodwill, by including the "product nature" test, would
be most welcome. 148 But in any event, all concerned should avoid
being sidetracked on section 526, and instead continue to examine the
merits of the unique and confounding riddle known as "the gray
market."
that the statute barred only the importation of counterfeit goods, and did not reach genu-
ine, gray market goods. Id. at 770.
148. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.

